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In this paper, the author provides an overview of economic inequality in inter-
collegiate athletics, tracing it from its origins in the late 19th century, through 
home rule, the introduction of the NCAA’s national broadcasting policy and its 
subsequent regionalization after Oklahoma v. NCAA, conference realignments, 
RSNs, the BCS and NCAA distribution policies. The paper argues that the current 
economic situation and the growing inequality is unsustainable and that policies 
to reverse the course are necessary. Policies to moderate inequality will not only 
assist in promoting financial stability but will also blunt the all-out drive to win 
and thereby help to reestablish the primacy of education in intercollegiate athletics.
Inequality in intercollegiate athletics began when intercollegiate athletics 
began. The first college sports contest, the rowing match between the Harvard and 
Yale boat clubs at Lake Winnipesaukee in 1852, was infused with commercial 
motives. The manager of the Boston, Concord and Montreal Railroad organized 
the event to advertise its rail service to wealthy clientele in New York and Boston. 
The railroad company lured the boat teams to the match with “unlimited alcohol” 
and “lavish prizes.” The first known college sports eligibility abuse came three 
years later at another Harvard/Yale meet, when the Harvard team’s coxswain was 
not a student.
In 1862, the first Morrill Land Grant College Act was passed to provide states 
with federal land on which to establish state schools to teach agriculture, engineer-
ing, and military tactics. Many states took advantage of the program to establish 
universities, even when they did not have sufficient qualified population to enroll 
in postsecondary education. Together with liberal arts colleges, technical institutes, 
and preexisting state universities, there grew up an intense competition to fill the 
appreciable excess supply of available beds at U.S. colleges. In this context, schools 
sought whatever competitive advantage they could identify. Intercollegiate sports 
came to be seen as central to promoting a college to prospective applicants. Allen 
Sack and Ellen Staurowsky (1998) write:
In the late 1800s few campus activities could better meet that need than inter-
collegiate sport. Nothing could better attract the attention of mass media, and 
nothing had a greater appeal to the practical-minded business leaders who 
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provided financial support and who increasingly came to dominate academe’s 
governing boards. (p. 20)
In 1890, Woodrow Wilson, then President of Princeton University, told alumni: 
“Princeton is noted in this wide world for three things: football, baseball, and col-
legiate instruction” (Zimbalist, 2001, p. 7).
Rainey Harper, University of Chicago President in the early 1890s, hired 
former Yale football star Amos Alonzo Stagg to coach football. Harper told Stagg 
to “develop teams which we can send around the country and knock out all the 
colleges” (Sack & Staurowski, 1998, p. 21). Harper reportedly provided Stagg 
with a trust fund of $80,000, originally earmarked for low-income students, for 
recruiting and subsidizing athletes, and commented, “We will give them a palace, 
car and a vacation too” (p. 21).
On top of operating expenses, schools also began to lavish resources on athletic 
fields and stadiums to promote their teams. In 1878, many critics were aghast that 
Yale rented a field in Hoboken, New Jersey for $300 to play Princeton in football. In 
1903, Harvard was the first college to build a concrete stadium, designed explicitly 
for football. Yale followed with the Yale Bowl in 1914, the University of Pennsylva-
nia’s Franklin Field was expanded for football in 1922, the University of California 
at Berkeley built a stadium with a seating capacity of 76,000 in 1923, Baker Field 
at Columbia University was finished in 1928, and so it went with schools readily 
raising their football budgets in an effort to stay competitive.
For our purposes, the essence of these practices is that the intercollegiate athlet-
ics market was competitive and each of the producers sought advantage from athletic 
success. The outcome of such a market process, especially one without meaningful 
regulation, is inequality: strength nourishes strength and weakness feeds weakness.
Although the modalities, manifestations, and magnitudes of this competitive 
process varied over the years, the fundamental outcome of increasing inequality 
has remained constant. As NCAA schools moved away from the laissez-faire, 
home rule period, lesser known or poorly endowed universities protested when 
new regulations favored their more famous, wealthy competitors. The dissolution 
of the Sanity Code and, soon thereafter, the principles of NCAA broadcasting 
policy responded to concerns about growing inequality. The discussion that follows 
attempts to highlight the key factors, beyond the competitive marketplace, that have 
promoted the increasing inequality in college sports.
Sources of Inequality
Broadcasting Policy and Board of Regents v. NCAA
From 1951 until 1981, the NCAA’s basic broadcasting policy was to limit each 
school to two television appearances per year.1 The NCAA skimmed between 4 
and 12% off the top, and the rest was distributed to the colleges whose games 
were televised, with appearances in a nationally televised game bringing around 
30% more than a regionally televised game (Byers, 1995). However effective this 
policy may have been in the aggregate, it left few satisfied customers. The big-time 
football programs wanted more exposure and the small programs wanted greater 
revenue sharing.
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At a special summer convention in 1973, the Association moved to placate 
the big-time colleges by breaking into three divisions. Each division would oper-
ate with significant autonomy, setting its own policies with regard to scholarship 
limits or number of coaches per sport. The NCAA Council would now have eight 
representatives from Division I and only three each from Divisions II and III. The 
Association attempted to mollify Divisions II and III by giving each its own football 
championship televised by ABC. In recognition of this, the two lower divisions 
would be allocated $500,000 of the new $16 million TV contract.
Conspicuously omitted from the benefits of this juggling act were the weaker 
Division I institutions, such as California State University at Long Beach which 
did not appear on television and, in 1974, averaged fewer than 6,000 spectators per 
game. It is not surprising that Cal State at Long Beach President Stephen Horn, in 
July 1975, proposed that 50% of all television revenues (including bowl games) 
be divided equally among NCAA members not appearing on television. Cries of 
socialism resounded throughout the Association. Horn’s plan was rejected, but its 
consideration sufficiently discombobulated the big-time schools that it stimulated 
new centrifugal forces within the Association.
Concerned by the implications of the Horn plan, 25 individuals representing 
schools from seven major football conferences as well as Notre Dame and Penn 
State met in Chicago on October 15, 1975. A steering committee was formed that 
eventually recommended the partitioning of Division I into two echelons; the upper 
echelon would be composed of the top 70 or 80 football schools, and these schools 
would be able largely to self-govern. When no such reorganization occurred at the 
NCAA’s 1976 convention, the steering committee prepared the launch of the Col-
lege Football Association (CFA).
The CFA’s first meeting was held in June 1977 with 61 members. As little more 
than a lobbying bloc within the NCAA, the CFA had little to show for its efforts 
after two years of operation. The share of television appearances by CFA members 
dropped from 67% in 1977 to 55% in 1979; meanwhile, TV ratings for college 
football fell from 14.1 to 11.4 (Smith, 1994, p. 78). CFA members naturally linked 
these two developments, arguing that fans were only interested in watching the 
top teams on television. The CFA stepped up its lobbying and initiated discussions 
with the networks for a separate TV contract.
In 1981, the CFA reached preliminary agreement with NBC for a four-year deal 
worth $180 million. The CFA hierarchy had only to persuade its rank-and-file to 
bolt the NCAA television structure. The prospective CFA deal was enough to wrest 
an important concession out of the NCAA at its 1981 convention—the Association 
voted to split Division I into two parts, A and AA, and to allow each to control its 
own television policy. The top level would now have 105, instead of 180 schools.
The CFA leadership, though, argued that this did not go far enough. The top 
football schools numbered no more than 80. Indeed, some ADs and coaches of CFA 
institutions went further. Oklahoma’s head coach, Barry Switzer, stated that what 
was needed was an Association of the top 40 football colleges. Switzer explained:
We could set our own rules. Maybe give the players $50 a day. Get rid of the 
95 [football grant-in-aid limit]…. I don’t care how many coaches Missouri 
has. If they want 20, let them have 20…. If we’re expelled from the NCAA 
it could enable us to do some things that are realistic (Byers, 1995, p. 277).
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But the concession to subdivide Division I, the increase in the maximum 
number of yearly TV appearances per school to three, and the handsome new 
NCAA TV contract with ABC, CBS, and TBS (more than double the previous one 
with ABC) led a majority of the CFA members to stay with the NCAA. Some CFA 
schools, however, were not willing to go down without a fight. Oklahoma, despite 
being the preeminent power in college football during the seventies, was earning 
$228,035 from the NCAA in 1979, less than 1% of the NCAA’s total contract with 
ABC. Oklahoma was not willing to accept the status quo. Neither was the Uni-
versity of Georgia. The two schools filed an antitrust suit against the NCAA at the 
end of 1981. This suit, after passing through the trial and appeals courts, led to the 
game changing Board of Regents v. NCAA decision by the Supreme Court in 1984.
While the basic structure of the NCAA television plan remained the same 
over the years, the restrictions grew less severe. Gradually more broadcasts and 
more exceptions were allowed. In the last four-year contract with ABC, CBS, and 
Turner, ABC and CBS would carry nationally 14 games each, and Turner would 
show 19 evening games. With exceptions for regional and local games, in 1983 
there were 242 games broadcast involving 173 different schools. The rights fees 
paid to the participating schools were set by the plan and only those schools which 
were televised received a piece of the $74.2 million television revenues in 1983.2
In brief, the Supreme Court looked at this information and ruled in a 7-to-2 
decision that the NCAA was behaving as a cartel, in illegal restraint of trade. This 
meant that through its television package, the NCAA was artificially limiting the 
number and selection of games shown. Thus, if consumers wished to watch the 
Oklahoma Sooners play more than three times a year, they could not. This restric-
tion lowered consumer welfare and was a violation of Section One of the Sherman 
Antitrust Act of 1890. In the free marketplace, perhaps there was a television station 
in Oklahoma that wanted to carry additional Sooner games and that the Oklahoma 
athletic department was ready to strike a deal with this station. The NCAA policy 
did not allow this to happen, and it thereby restrained trade and lowered welfare.
Further, the Supreme Court charged the NCAA with price fixing. That is, the 
price or rights fee received by the producers (the televised football teams) was set 
ahead of time, largely independent of the quality of the teams or the popularity of 
the contest (Lawrence, 1987). For instance, in the fall of 1981 there was a televised 
contest on ABC between USC and Oklahoma, each team was ranked in the top 
five nationally, and it was carried on over 200 stations. On another weekend that 
fall ABC televised a game between Appalachian State and the Citadel which was 
carried on only 4 stations. All four teams received the same rights fees.
The Court was endorsing the economic argument that such interference with 
the market price would encourage overproduction of football at inferior football 
schools and underproduction of football at superior schools. Finally, the Court 
argued that the NCAA TV package represented a group boycott; that is, once the 
pact with ABC, CBS, and Turner was signed, there was a de facto boycott by all 
NCAA members of NBC and other broadcast and cable stations.
The NCAA’s defense was that (a) if it allowed too many football games to 
be broadcast on television, it would threaten live attendance at the games and (b) 
by spreading television appearances out among the majority of Division I football 
schools, it allowed television revenues to be distributed more equally among the 
schools (Dunnavant, 2004). The more even revenue distribution, in turn, promoted 
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more equal playing strength among the teams and fostered the amateur spirit by 
reducing the financial reward received by a school having a top-flight football team.
The Supreme Court’s response to the NCAA was, first, that it did not matter 
if broadcasts lowered live attendance. If fans had a choice, they would choose the 
option that gave them the most pleasure per dollar. The relevant datum was not 
whether fewer people were in attendance, but whether the sum of fans in attendance 
plus fans watching on television would be greater if the TV restrictions were lifted. 
Further, the Court noted that the NCAA already broadcast its national and regional 
games at the same time the live games were played. Second, the Court argued that 
it was not clear that the TV plan promoted competitive balance and suggested there 
would be more effective ways to do so that would have a less restrictive impact on 
the number and variety of television broadcasts.
In its majority opinion, however, the Court did not directly address the relevance 
of promoting the values and institutions of amateurism—an area that received little 
attention in the NCAA’s defense.3 In the Court’s dissenting opinion, written by 
Justice White, and joined by Justice Rehnquist, it is maintained that, in supporting 
the more equal distribution of television exposure and revenues, the NCAA plan 
reduced the incentive to win. A reduced financial incentive to win, in turn, sup-
ported the primacy of academic matters and discouraged commercialism, frenetic 
recruiting efforts, high salaries for coaches, and so on. Justice White maintained 
the majority decision treated college sports strictly as a commercial enterprise, and 
ignored its central purpose as a complement to the academic mission of the univer-
sity. The open commercialization of college sports, White opined, would only serve 
to undermine the intended subservient role of athletics in the educational process.
The division within the Supreme Court reflects the inherently hybrid char-
acter of intercollegiate athletics, which is, in part, amateur and, in part, intensely 
commercial. By applying normal standards of free enterprise, the majority of the 
Court was giving freer rein to the further commercialization of college sports. The 
resulting potential for heightened revenue, in turn, led universities to devote even 
greater resources to seeking athletic success.
Of course, had the Supreme Court upheld the NCAA policy, it is possible that 
another, perhaps more commercialized, scenario would have ensued. The Universi-
ties of Oklahoma, Georgia, Notre Dame and many others from the CFA may have 
seceded from the NCAA and signed their own television agreement. While this 
would have created a hyper-commercialized sector within college sports, it might 
also have reduced the commercialization tendencies within the rest of the NCAA.
With the NCAA’s TV policy struck down, schools and conferences were left to 
fend for themselves. The NCAA television cartel was broken. The leading football 
colleges and conferences were cut free and the weaker football colleges lost the 
protection of the NCAA plan.
What did happen in the wake of the Supreme Court decision was predictable. 
In the short run, disorder reigned. Oklahoma, Georgia, Nebraska and USC put their 
football contests up for sale, but they were disappointed with the networks’ offers. 
Notre Dame got the largest offer, $20 million, but turned it down. Scurrying about 
to arrange a deal in time for the 1984 season, the CFA managed to ink one-year 
deals with ABC and ESPN worth $35 million. In addition to the CFA pact, the Big 
10 and Pac-10 signed their own contract with CBS for around $10 million. The 
combined value of the CFA and Big 10/Pac-10 deals was some 60% below the 
10  Zimbalist
value of the NCAA’s 1983 contracts despite the fact that it involved roughly twice 
as many network games (Porto, 2012, p.74).
Some economists have viewed this outcome as a confirmation of monopoly 
theory: monopolists artificially lower output below and raise price above competi-
tive levels. Thus, when the NCAA monopoly power in the television market was 
broken up, the resulting output was higher (almost double the number of televised 
games) and the price (TV revenue per game) was lower. While this dynamic prob-
ably explains part of the price drop in 1984, it is likely that a substantial portion 
of the drop is attributable to the inexperience and disorganization of the Division 
I football colleges in negotiating television deals as well as the shortness of time 
before the 1984 season. Indeed, for 1984 it was not only the revenue per game but the 
overall revenue from television that had fallen.4 There was not, after all, very much 
competition in 1984—only two groups, the CFA and the Big 10/Pac-10, existed.
Ironically, it was not until the CFA/Big10/Pac-10 duopoly of the 1980s gave 
way to more competition in the 1990s that television revenue from college football 
began its next rapid ascent. In 1990, Notre Dame broke from the CFA and signed 
its own 5-year deal with NBC, worth $38 million. Consequent to Notre Dame’s 
withdrawal, the new 5-year deal that the CFA had inked with ABC and ESPN was 
reduced by $35 million down to $300 million, which was still $25 million more 
per year than its previous 1987–90 contract.
Notre Dame’s bolting from the CFA, however, had a larger significance. It 
revealed the fragility of the CFA cartel and the potential attractiveness for other 
schools or conferences to do their own negotiating. Conferences took this message 
to heart and began discussions with the networks. They were given a basic lesson in 
television economics. Their rights fees would grow in proportion to the size of their 
market. Further, the larger was each conference, the fewer would be the number of 
conferences in Division IA and the lesser the competition. And significantly, the 
NCAA passed a new rule allowing conferences with at least 12 teams to split into 
two divisions and hold a championship game.
Not surprisingly, the conferences began to realign and expand to extend their 
market coverage. The first step was taken by the Big 10, which voted in June 1990 
to admit Penn State into its conference. The Atlantic Coast Conference (ACC) added 
previously independent Florida State. The Southeastern Conference (SEC) expanded 
to 12 teams and the Big 8 annexed four teams from the Southwest Conference.
Geographically enhanced, the conferences one by one broke off from the CFA 
cartel and signed their own TV deals. In February 1994, the SEC led the way with 
an $85 million deal with CBS, commencing after the last year (1995–96) of the 
CFA contract with ABC and ESPN. Three days later the ACC signed up with ABC 
and ESPN; the next day the Big East inked a deal with CBS and three weeks later 
the Big 8 entered into a contract with ABC and Liberty Sports.
The data in Table 1, which draw from various NCAA reports, illustrate the rev-
enue distributional impact of the 1984 Supreme Court decision and the conference 
restructuring of the 1990s. During the 18 years between 1962 and 1980, there was a 
steady increase in revenue inequality across the top 150 college athletic programs, 
with the ratio of the top revenue program to the average revenue program increasing 
by 0.67 points. During the next 17 year period, 1980–1997, the ratio of the top to 
average program increased at an accelerated pace, by 1.00 points.
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It is also noteworthy that the Supreme Court ruling was largely coincident with 
the explosion in popularity of cable television in the United States. Whereas in 1980 
there were 15.5 million cable TV homes (or 19.9% of TV households), by 1990 
there were 52 million cable TV homes (or 56.4% of TV households). As is well 
known, cable television adds a second revenue stream (monthly subscription fees) 
to the traditional advertising stream, and, hence, its expansion helps to explain the 
rapid growth in television contracts for the elite football conferences in Division I.
Bowl Championship Series
Another factor promoting inequality is the existence of the Bowl Championship 
Series (BCS) within the Football Bowl Subdivision (FBS). The BCS is presently 
being restructured for 2015. However, its new form has not been fully decided or, 
at least, if it has, only partial information has been publicly revealed as of January 
2013 (see McMurphy, 2012; Myerberg, 2012). Since its inception in 1998 through 
2014, it has allowed for preferential bowl access and sharply differential revenues 
to flow to the six original BCS (aka, automatic qualifier or AQ) conferences.
Overall, during the first thirteen years of the system, BCS bowls have included 
105 appearances by AQ conference teams and only seven appearances by non-AQ 
conference teams. As seen in Table 2, during 2007–2011, total payouts from the 
BCS bowls amounted to $722.1 million, of which $618.4 million (or 85.6%) has 
gone to AQ conferences.
NCAA Distributions
In 2011–12, the NCAA redistributed $467 million to Division I schools (see Table 
3); that is, the Association distributed 61% of its revenues to 32% of its schools. 
The six elite conferences within the FBS of Division I received approximately 48% 
Table 1 Revenue Inequality Among the Approximately Top 150 
Athletic Programs, 1962–1997
Year Top School/Average School
1962 1.81
1970 1.92
1980 2.48
1989 3.04
1995 3.29
1997 3.48
Note. Sources: Mitchell Raiborn, Financial Analysis of Intercollegiate Athletics. Kansas City: NCAA, 
1970; M. Raiborn, Revenues and Expenses of Intercollegiate Athletic Programs, 1970–1977, 1978–1981, 
1981–1985, 1985–1989. Overland Park: NCAA, 1978, 1982, 1986, 1990; Daniel Fulks, Revenues 
and Expenses of Intercollegiate Athletic Programs, 1993. Overland Park: NCAA, 1994; D. Fulks, 
Revenues and Expenses of Division I and II Intercollegiate Athletic Programs, 1995, 1997. Overland 
Park: NCAA, 1996, 1998.
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of the total revenue disbursement. These six conferences represented 73 schools, 
accounting for 21.5% of Division 1 schools and only 6.9% of all NCAA members. 
The nonelite conferences received the other 52%. The nonelite conferences represent 
267 schools, 78.5% of Division I schools. Division II (with 26.5% of the NCAA’s 
schools) received 4.37% of NCAA revenues (or 6.4% of distributions) and Division 
III (with 41.5% of schools) received 3.18% (or 4.6% of distributions).
Of course, it may be argued that Division I schools generate almost all of the 
NCAA’s revenue and, therefore, they are entitled to a disproportionate share of 
the revenue. Still, if the NCAA is trying to promote balance on the playing fields, 
amateurism, and the primacy of education, as it claims; then a more equal distribu-
tion of revenues would better suit these goals.
Table 2 BCS Revenue Distribution by Conference
Conference 2009–10 2010–11
Big 10 $22.2 million $27.2 million
SEC $22.2 million $27.2 million
ACC $17.7 million $21.2 million
Big 12 $17.7 million $21.2 million
Big East $17.7 million $21.2 million
Pac 10 $17.7 million $27.2 million
Notre Dame $1.3 million $1.6 million
Total AQ $116.5 million $146.8 million
MWC $9.8 million N/A
WAC $7.8 million N/A
C-USA $2.8 million N/A
MAC $2.1 million N/A
Sun Belt $1.5 million N/A
Total Non-AQ $24.0 million $24.7 million
Table 3 NCAA Revenue Distributions, 2011–12
# Schools % Schools Millions $ % Distribution
Division I 340 32.0% $467 89.00%
 AQ 73 6.9% $224.2 42.70%
 Non-AQ, FCS, NFS 267 25.1% $242.8 46.30%
Division II 282 26.5% $33.5 6.40%
Division III 442 41.5% $24.3 4.60%
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The skewed revenue distribution is mirrored by the NCAA’s power structure, 
which leans heavily toward representation from Division I, and within Division I, 
heavily toward the FBS. The NCAA Executive Committee carries the deciding vote 
regarding policy issues affecting the entire Association. This Committee consists 
of 16 voting members and 4 nonvoting members. Of the 16 voting members, 8 
are chancellors or presidents from FBS institutions. The remainder of the Execu-
tive Committee is a smattering of smaller Division I football programs, as well as 
Division II and Division III chancellors or presidents.
The Division I Board of Directors sets Division I policy. It consists of 11 
FBS presidents and 7 non-FBS presidents (who rotate among the 20 non-FBS 
conferences.) Thus, FBS, with 120 schools, has 61% of the voting power on the 
Division I Board, despite the fact that it represents only 36% of the 340 schools 
in Division I. Of the 11 FBS representatives, 6 representatives and the chair of the 
Board come from the six elite (or AQ) conferences within FBS. The Division I 
Leadership Council is responsible for advising the Division I Board of Directors, 
overseeing the appointment and substructure of cabinets and committees, and taking 
final action on matters delegated to it by the Board of Directors. The Leadership 
Council is comprised of 31 members, one from each conference. However, the 
amount of voting power differs by conference. Representatives from the six elite 
conferences and Conference USA each receive three votes. The other 4 remaining 
FBS conference representatives each receive 1.5 votes. The 20 non-FBS conference 
representatives each receive 1.2 votes. Thus, the FBS conferences have a combined 
27 votes while the non-FBS conferences have 24.
The Division I Legislative Council has the same structure as the Leadership 
Council. The FBS conferences have the majority of the votes. The Legislative 
Council is the primary legislative authority. It is in charge of developing educational 
material regarding pending legislation. While the objective is equity, the structure 
of the governing NCAA committees reveals a bias toward prominent football 
institutions from the elite conferences.
Digital TV, the Internet and Conference-Based Networks
The advance of the digital age has allowed for the multiplication of specialized 
television programming. Part of the consequent channel proliferation has been 
in regional sports networks. Sports programming has grown more popular not 
only with the culture’s increasing fascination with sport, but also with the rapid 
introduction of the digital video recorder (DVR) which allows, at the click of a 
button, the recording of television shows and their replay at a later time without 
commercials. Since sports fans generally want to watch their sports live, while TV 
dramas, sitcoms, and other programming are not time sensitive and can be watched 
hours or days later without any, or only a minimal, sacrifice of viewing enjoyment, 
advertisers are showing a heightened interest in sports. This has driven the demand 
for new regional sports networks (RSNs) upward, just as the institutional uncertainty 
engendered by Internet streaming possibilities has whetted the appetite of cable 
distribution companies and networks to own sports programming. The result has 
been twofold: (a) rapidly rising rights fees and (b) joint ventures between media 
companies and college sport conferences to form RSNs.
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The Big Ten Conference and the Fox Entertainment Group created the first such 
RSN in 2007. Today, the Big Ten Network (BTN) reaches over 40 million house-
holds across the U.S. and Canada and shows over 360 Big Ten live sporting events 
each year. BTN generally carries the less competitive and less popular conference 
football and basketball games, as well as games from the “non-revenue” sports, 
allowing the Big Ten to sell the TV rights to the networks for its most valuable 
contests. Nevertheless, BTN charges distributors as much as 90 cents per month per 
subscriber and pays out over $6 million to each Big Ten school annually. Between 
BTN and national network contracts, the Big Ten is able to distribute some $25 mil-
lion television dollars to each school per year. BTN has created a mobile app called 
BTN2Go. For a fee it will be available to fans and alumni throughout the world.
Attempting to broaden its geographical reach and to expand to 12 members, 
which enables a split into two divisions and a conference playoff game, the Big 
Ten announced in December 2009 its intention to add an additional member. This 
announcement kicked off a second wave of conference realignments.
Shortly after the Big Ten’s intention was made public, the Pac-10 announced 
similar plans. On June 7, 2010 the Pac-10 issued invitations to Colorado, Oklahoma, 
Oklahoma State, Texas, Texas A&M, and Texas Tech to join its conference. On 
June 9, 2010, it was announced that Nebraska would enter the Big Ten, engender-
ing uncertainty about the future of the Big 12 Conference. The next day Colorado 
accepted the Pac-10’s invitation, while the other schools opted to remain in the 
Big 12. In the cases of Texas and Oklahoma, however, the schools were able to 
negotiate privileged status, putting new strains on the conference. Utah accepted a 
Pac-10 invitation on June 17, 2010. These machinations in the Big Ten and Pac-10 
created reverberations first in the Big 12, and as the Big 12 began to shake, then 
so did the other FBS conferences. The earth was moving under the each school’s 
feet and an urgent need to find the most solid and lucrative conference deal led 
program after program to shift conferences.
BTN’s remarkable initial success, together with the new opportunities opened 
up by the digital revolution, inspired other schools and conferences to maximize the 
new media revenue opportunities. The Pac-12 started its own RSN, with regional 
subsidiaries, and signed a deal with ESPN and Fox averaging $21 million per school 
per year. The Big 12 also signed a deal with ESPN and Fox for $2.6 billion over 
13 years (or $20 million per school per year.) In May 2012, the ACC restructured 
its TV deal with ESPN, which will be worth $17.1 million per school annually, 
once Pittsburgh and Syracuse officially join the conference. In June 2012, the SEC 
signed a new, 15-year TV deal with ESPN and CBS that will provide an average 
of $19.5 million per school annually and allow for the possible launching of an 
SEC RSN in 2014.
The merger and acquisition phase of college conferences is still active as 
I write in early 2013. The Western Athletic Conference, having lost its football 
powerhouses, has declared that it will no longer play football. The Big East is now 
eviscerated, having lost its strongest football and basketball schools. Generally, the 
old and new members of the Big Ten, the Pac-12, the SEC, the ACC and the Big 
12 will benefit financially, at least in the near future, from these developments. 
The other FBS schools will find their relative financial position diminished. To no 
one’s surprise, the rich will get richer and the poor will get poorer. Below I turn 
to consider the available data on revenue inequality in college sports since 2000.
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Revenue Inequality Since 2000
Revenue distribution data before 2000 is scarce, and that which is available is gener-
ally tabulated with different metrics than what is available since 2000. It is therefore 
difficult to get an accurate picture of how much inequality has increased over the 
decades. Further, due to inconsistent and incomplete accounting practices within 
athletic departments and the fact that a good deal of revenue and cost information 
is treated as proprietary, it is impossible even today to achieve a full and accurate 
picture of the extent of inequality. Nonetheless, it is possible to compile pieces of 
information from the periodic NCAA Revenues and Expenses reports (Fulks, 2005, 
2008, 2011), the EADA reports (http://ope.ed.gov/athletics/), and other sources 
to assemble a broad outline of the trends and the status quo in revenue inequality 
among FBS programs.
In Table 1, we presented data on the highest to average revenue ratio for roughly 
the top 150 athletic programs between 1962 and 1997. It depicted a clear trend 
toward greater inequality with some acceleration in the trend after the 1984 Supreme 
Court decision. The post-2003 data are for the FBS (120 schools in 2010–11) and 
it refers to the highest to the median revenue ratio. With the skewed revenue dis-
tribution that prevails in the FBS, the mean will typically be considerably above 
the median, so these two data series are not comparable.
Although the top/average revenue ratio series ends in 1997, it is possible to 
extend the trend through 2003 by reference to NCAA data for football and men’s 
basketball programs. Table 4 shows that the ratio of the highest revenue program 
from football and men’s basketball to the average revenue program steadily 
increased from 3.56 in fy1997, to 3.66 in fy1999 and to 3.89 in fy2003.
After 2003, the average program is no longer reported; only the median is 
reported. As shown in Table 5, the ratio of the highest to median school for foot-
ball and men’s basketball revenue continues its steady ascent between fy2004 and 
fy2010.
Table 4 FBS Football and Men’s Basketball Revenue, 1997–2003
High Average Ratio (high/avg)
1997 $37,400,000 $10,500,000 3.56
1999 $44,700,000 $12,200,000 3.66
2003 $67,300,000 $17,300,000 3.89
Table 5 FBS Football and Men’s Basketball Revenue, 2004–2010
High Median
Ratio  
(high/median)
2004 $62,708,000 $11,501,000 5.45
2007 $89,379,000 $15,740,000 5.68
2010 $119,833,000 $20,986,000 5.71
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From 2004 forward, the highest to median total program revenue is also avail-
able. Table 6 depicts this ratio, along with the top to median expenditure ratio, for 
2004 and 2010. These total revenues include both generated revenues and allocated 
revenues from the university or state government. Since the lower revenue programs 
receive more university and government subsidies, the inequality in generated 
revenues is considerably higher than in total revenues. In 2010, the ratio of top to 
median generated revenues was 4.07.
It is important to note that the top/median expense ratio is lower than that of 
the top/median revenue ratio and that it falls between 2004 and 2010, even as the 
ratio grows for revenue. As revenues grow more unequal in FBS, costs are level-
ing, suggesting that certain program costs are sticky and that the lower revenue 
programs are accelerating spending in an effort to catch up to the successful ones. 
This pattern is consistent with the growing operating deficits of the average pro-
gram, as depicted in Table 7.
Also note that the top/median revenue ratio, while still increasing, has basi-
cally leveled off. This is indicative of a general pattern over the last ten years 
wherein relative inequality is stabilizing while absolute inequality continues to 
grow significantly.
The numbers in Table 7 indicate that the median FBS program lost over $11 
million on an operating basis in fy2010, almost double its losses in fy2004. It is 
important to underscore that these losses do not include the bulk of capital costs 
which one study commissioned by the NCAA estimated could exceed $20 million 
a year at a typical FBS institution (Orszag & Orszag, 2005)
Another view of revenue inequality by deciles in the FBS is provided in Table 
8. Although the two years are not neatly comparable because the fy2003 data are for 
total revenues and the fy2010 data are for generated revenues, there is an apparent 
trend toward greater inequality. The standard deviation of the revenue more than 
doubles between the two years.
Yet another perspective on growing inequality is shown in Table 9, which 
reports on revenue distribution across FBS conferences, with emphasis on the 
automatic qualifying (AQ) and nonautomatic qualifying (non-AQ) conferences. 
Table 6 FBS Total Athletic Program Ratios
Top/Median Revenue Top/Median Expense
2004 3.72 3.11
2010 3.74 2.79
Table 7 FBS Net Revenue on Operating Basis
Highest Median
2004 $13,774,000 -$6,127,000
2010 $13,118,000 -$11,352,000
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Considering football and men’s basketball revenue together, the standard devia-
tion of revenue distribution by conference increased sharply from $144.0 million 
in 2003 to $237.4 million in 2010. Further, separating FBS into AQ and non-AQ 
conferences, Table 8 shows that the difference in the average total revenue of AQ and 
non-AQ conferences grew from $243.7 million in 2003 to $387.3 million in 2010.5
The familiar virtuous cycle or positive feedback loop is working here: strong 
teams lead to high attendance and television revenues, which provides the resources 
to reinforce the strong teams, and so on. Upward mobility is limited by this tight 
loop: of the FBS schools in the top decile of revenue generators in 2005, 80% of 
them remained in the top decile in 2010 (Cheslock & Knight, 2012).
Table 8 FBS Men’s Total Revenues, 2003
Percentile More than Less Than Range Avg
0–10 $1,145,000 $2,700,000 $1,922,500
11–20 $2,700,000 $5,200,000 $3,950,000
21–30 $5,200,000 $7,400,000 $6,300,000
31–40 $7,400,000 $11,200,000 $9,300,000
41–50 $11,200,000 $15,700,000 $13,450,000
51–60 $15,700,000 $20,800,000 $18,250,000
61–70 $20,800,000 $26,000,000 $23,400,000
71–80 $26,000,000 $31,500,000 $28,750,000
81–90 $31,500,000 $41,000,000 $36,250,000
91–100 $41,000,000 $68,000,000 $54,500,000
SD $16,577,883
FBS Total Generated Revenues, 2010
Percentile More than Less Than Range Avg
0–10 $3,820,000 $6,083,000 $4,951,500
11–20 $6,084,000 $8,294,000 $7,189,000
21–30 $8,295,000 $13,281,000 $10,788,000
31–40 $13,282,000 $22,973,000 $18,127,500
41–50 $22,974,000 $35,365,000 $29,169,500
51–60 $35,366,000 $44,330,000 $39,848,000
61–70 $44,331,000 $57,615,000 $50,973,000
71–80 $57,616,000 $71,093,000 $64,354,500
81–90 $71,094,000 $97,715,000 $84,404,500
91–100 $97,716,000 $143,555,000 $120,635,500
SD $37,784,11
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Table 9 FBS Conference Inequality, 2003–2010
Conference
Total Football 
Revenue
Total Men’s 
Basketball 
Revenue
Football + 
Basketball 
Revenue
2003 Atlantic Coast $180,171,498 $89,947,019 $270,118,517
Big East $123,255,993 $64,569,934 $187,825,927
Big Ten $276,809,402 $105,113,003 $381,922,405
Big 12 $258,812,764 $78,194,746 $337,007,510
Conference 
USA
$69,615,428 $29,599,122 $99,214,550
Mid-American $33,280,645 $15,693,288 $48,973,933
Mountain West $53,061,049 $34,001,598 $87,062,647
Pacific-10 $176,744,243 $60,011,337 $236,755,580
Southeastern $350,193,187 $81,250,948 $431,444,135
Sun Belt $22,333,410 $12,182,508 $34,515,918
Western Athletic $34,188,546 $15,283,538 $49,472,084
 SD $113,607,693 $33,294,075 $144,048,005
 AQ avg $227,664,515 $79,847,831 $307,512,346
 Non-AQ avg $42,495,816 $21,352,011 $63,847,826
 AQ−Non-AQ $185,168,699 $58,495,820 $243,664,519
2010 Atlantic Coast $278,558,264 $146,638,009 $425,196,273
Big East $221,618,743 $122,963,744 $344,582,487
Big Ten $466,123,523 $152,852,255 $618,975,778
Big 12 $431,271,998 $121,797,935 $553,069,933
Conference 
USA
$111,232,908 $56,707,091 $167,939,999
Mid-American $80,508,627 $36,288,065 $116,796,692
Mountain West $105,176,368 $51,528,057 $156,704,425
Pacific-10 $252,858,608 $90,156,086 $343,014,694
Southeastern $640,229,277 $138,777,080 $779,006,357
Sun Belt $56,678,431 $24,526,765 $81,205,196
Western Athletic $67,120,620 $26,709,080 $93,829,700
 SD $193,162,379 $50,359,583 $237,384,451
 AQ avg $381,776,736 $128,864,185 $510,640,920
 Non-AQ avg $84,143,391 $39,151,812 $123,295,202
 AQ−Non-AQ $297,633,345 $89,712,373 $387,345,718
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Historically strong football programs also find it easier to maintain attendance 
and revenue even during poor performance years. The correlation coefficient 
between win percentage and attendance during 2005–2011 was .16 for AQ schools 
and .35 for non-AQ schools. That is, attendance at non-AQ schools was much more 
sensitive to team performance than for AQ schools.
Finally, Table 10 presents a breakdown in the sources of revenue inequality 
among the four quartiles of athletic programs in FBS in fy 2010. There are four 
categories of revenues that account for the lion’s share of the differences between 
the top quartile and bottom quartile of athletic programs: ticket sales where the aver-
age difference between programs in the top and bottom quartiles is $23.3 million; 
NCAA and conference distributions where it is $18.1 million; alumni donations 
Table 10 Sources of Revenues Division I—FBS by Expense Quartile Fiscal 
Year 2010, Median Values in Current Dollars
First (High) 
Quartile
Second 
Quartile
Third 
Quartile
Fourth (Low) 
Quartile
Total Ticket Sales 24,418,000 12,704,000 6,258,000 1,113,000
NCAA and conference distribu-
tions
19,334,000 9,914,000 3,661,000 1,233,000
Guarantees and options 412,000 623,000 615,000 1,085,000
Cash contributions from alumni 
and others
23,616,000 10,942,000 5,304,000 1,423,000
Third Party Support 0 0 0 0
Other:
Concessions/Programs/Novelties 1,831,000 1,453,000 631,000 136,000
Broadcast Rights 1,665,000 83,000 53,000 0
Royalties/Advertising /Sponsor-
ship
6,534,000 4,197,000 1,399,000 590,000
Sports camps 557,000 12,000 15,000 157,000
Endowment/ Investment 1,667,000 653,000 187,000 60,000
Miscellaneous 2,137,000 788,000 645,000 250,000
Total Generated Revenues 86,942,000 45,404,000 23,072,000 6,836,000
Allocated Revenues:
Direct Institutional Support 0 4,924,000 3,822,000 4,730,000
Indirect Institutional Support 0 122,000 365,000 728,000
Student Fees 0 1,583,000 1,714,000 4,891,000
Direct government support 0 0 0 0
Total Allocated Revenues 3,380,000 9,446,000 11,409,000 13,615,000
Total All Revenues 89,236,000 57,841,000 36,586,000 20,567,000
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where it is $22.2 million and the category of sponsorships, advertising and royalties 
where it is $5.9 million. Although some of the television money comes indirectly 
via the NCAA and conference distributions, the direct payment of television rights 
fees has only a diminutive differential of $1.7 million. Since it is in the area of 
television revenue that we can expect the largest differentials in the coming years 
(in some cases growing to over $20 million per school annually), the prospect for 
growing inequality in FBS is daunting.
Another important contrast lies in the comparison of institutional (school and 
government) subsidies to athletic programs. Overall, this component of athletic 
revenues in FBS has been growing rapidly, from 22% of total athletic revenues in 
fy2003 to 34.5% in fy2010. These subsidies are also very unevenly distributed across 
the quartiles. Average subsidies per program in 2010 were $3.4 million in the top 
quartile, $9.4 million in the second quartile, $11.4 million in the third quartile and 
$13.6 million in the bottom quartile. The growing inequality is clearly painting a 
bleak picture for all but the top FBS programs.
Analysis and Policy Options
Why is inequality a concern? Generally, sports leagues are preoccupied with 
inequality because it can impede the accomplishment of two basic league goals: 
competitive balance and financial stability. Competitive, or playing field balance, 
is important because it keeps contests close and fans interested. Financial stability 
is important because it secures steady participation in the league by all teams. In 
college sports, of course, financial stability is crucial to avoid too large a drain on 
a university’s educational budget.
The analog to competitive balance in professional sports leagues is competitive 
balance in athletic conferences. It is not, however, a perfect analogy, because college 
teams seek not only to win their conference, but also to win the national champi-
onship and throughout the season fans pay close attention to a school’s national 
ranking. There is a parallel here to the dual goal of European soccer leagues, where 
teams first try to win their domestic league and then try to win the pan-European 
Champions League. Both the domestic and international championships are roughly 
equal in reputational and financial value. In European soccer leagues there is less 
revenue sharing, because more sharing weakens the top domestic teams and reduces 
their chances of victory in the European competition. A similar dynamic has lim-
ited the pursuit of equality (and, hence, revenue sharing) within FBS conferences.
Financial stability has been a growing problem throughout college sports. The 
median deficit in FBS athletic programs has grown steadily over the last twenty 
years, from -$237,000 in fy1995 to -$11.4 million in fy 2010. As the data presented 
earlier suggests, revenue has grown more concentrated, but cost increases have 
been distributed more equally throughout all FBS schools. Inevitably, this means 
that more and more schools will suffer growing deficits. The schools in the richest 
FBS conferences, however, have recently seen their media revenue increase by 
roughly $15 million per year or more. The lead schools in those conferences are 
increasingly generating true accounting surpluses in their athletic programs. Other 
schools are coming closer to breaking even.
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Yet, even for those schools that are reaching a financial balance in athletics for 
the first time, there is a question about what the future holds. Several factors suggest 
that the explosion in media income may have created a bubble, including: (a) the 
impact of the DVR in shifting advertisers to sports; (b) the race of networks, cable 
and satellite distributors, and media companies to own sports programming in an 
uncertain institutional context; (c) the proliferation of video viewing and program-
ming options; (d) rapidly rising cable fees in an environment of tight household 
budget constraints; (e) the possibility that the FCC or Congress will impose some 
degree of a la carte pricing; and (f) the uncertainty about programming distribution 
systems with the growing prominence of the internet and mobile devices.6 Given 
these factors, it is sensible to expect that media income will either flatten out or 
decrease in the coming years. In the worst case scenario, some media companies may 
go bankrupt as a result of overpaying for rights fees and/or a shift in the regulatory 
environment, leading conference media contracts to bottom out.
Both because of the large and growing deficits faced by the majority of FBS 
programs and because the few financially fortunate FBS programs will likely face 
greater money pressure going forward, it makes sense to think about financial 
reform. A significant force behind the cost increases in college sports in recent 
years is the anticipated return from winning. Policies that would engender greater 
equality would also blunt the financial incentive to win, which, in turn, should 
reduce program expenditures on coaches’ salaries, recruitment, facilities, and travel, 
among other costs. Thus, equalizing the distribution of revenue may address both 
the goal of promoting greater competitive balance and the goal of containing costs. 
Serendipitously, it may also rebalance the scales in favor of educational attainment 
and intellectual growth.
While conferences could opt to share more internal revenue, most revenue 
inequality is between conferences. The only significant sources of extraconference 
revenue are the NCAA basketball tournament in March and the BCS. Greater rev-
enue equality would have to emanate from NCAA policy either to distribute March 
Madness revenues more equally and/or to introduce an FBS football playoff with 
a more equal dispersion of those revenues than practiced under the BCS.
Importantly, revenue redistribution can accomplish the important goal of 
changing the incentives facing intercollegiate programs by lowering the distribution 
tied to commercial success and raising the distribution tied to educational success. 
For example, in 2011–12 the NCAA distributed $467 million. Approximately 95% 
of the NCAA’s revenue comes from the March Madness Division I basketball 
tournament. Of the $467 million, $184.1 million (40%) was distributed to schools 
according to their success in the basketball tournament over the previous six years, 
$122.7 million (26%) went to the scholarship fund which is distributed to schools 
according to the number of student-athlete grants-in-aid they give,7 $61.4 million 
(13%) went to the sports sponsorship fund which is distributed to schools based 
on the number intercollegiate sports they sponsor, and $66 million (14%) went to 
the student assistance fund which primarily goes to support student financial need 
and preferentially is distributed to FBS schools. Thus, $368.2 million, or 78.8% of 
the total NCAA distribution, is allocated according either to success in the March 
basketball tournament or to the size of the athletic program and its scholarships. The 
second largest recipient is the $122.7 million allocated to the scholarship fund, which 
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strongly favors FBS programs where 85 full football grants-in-aid are allowed. This 
means that money generated in the sport of basketball is going to support football 
programs, which appears to make neither logical nor educational sense.
Although $23.4 million (5% of total) in the academic enhancement fund and 
modest portions of the student assistance and supplemental funds go to support the 
education of student-athletes, none of the $467 million is allocated according to the 
academic success of student-athletes or to other measures of school educational 
success.8 Restructuring these NCAA distributions, then, would not only be desir-
able from the perspective of financial solvency and blunting the incentives toward 
commercialism, but also from the perspective of incentivizing the schools’ focus on 
educational outcomes. In the name of intercollegiate athletic integrity, the NCAA 
passed in late October 2012 new measures to sternly penalize transgressions and 
abuses in athletic programs. Reforming NCAA distribution policy would be a logical 
next step in this direction. Of course, the skewed voting and control patterns that 
prevail in the NCAA’s decision-making bodies are likely to impede such progress.
Another way to deal with financial imbalances in intercollegiate programs is 
for the NCAA to legislate cost containment. The difficulty with this approach is 
that it is bound to run afoul of the nation’s antitrust laws. To be sure, the easiest 
route to equalizing the distribution of revenue–a national NCAA football televi-
sion contract–bumps up against the same constraint. The obvious answer is to 
have the U.S. Congress carefully craft a limited antitrust exemption for the NCAA 
that would allow the Association to control coaches’ compensation, cartelize the 
national television contract, limit recruiting expenditures, the number of coaches 
per team and the number of games per sport per season, and perhaps a few other 
things. This exemption could be granted in exchange for the NCAA organizing the 
national FBS football championship and following a more equal distribution of its 
March Madness and other central revenues.
Of course, this is easier said than done. The NCAA’s governing structure is 
effectively controlled by the AQ schools within FBS and even if this were not the 
case, the strong revenue producers could threaten to pull out of the Association. 
Were it bold and forward looking, Congress has another lever it could pull: threaten 
to end the tax privileges and workmen’s compensation status of any programs that 
do not submit to the NCAA’s new redistribution program, or to the entirety of the 
NCAA membership if the NCAA does not undertake said program.
Mobilizing the political support for such a reform will not be easy. What is 
different today than in the past is that the financial condition of U.S. colleges and 
intercollegiate athletics, and that state fiscal budgets that support them, are much 
shakier than ever before. College presidents and governing boards are compelled 
to pay attention to serious reform efforts that will moderate financial imbalances. 
The Knight Commission survey of FBS presidents in 2009 suggested a deeper 
concern and greater openness to real reform.
The intent of the reforms outlined above is to preserve and strengthen inter-
collegiate athletics by putting them on a sounder and more equitable financial 
footing. They would also promote the proper role of athletics in U.S. higher edu-
cation. Whether these or similar reforms come to fruition will depend upon the 
organizational effort and skill that are put behind them. One thing is certain: If 
reform-minded presidents and governing boards give up before they begin, then 
no productive change will result.
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Notes
1. This limit was increased to three in the NCAA’s 1981 contract with the networks.
2. The portion of the rights fee retained by the participating school varied, depending on 
conference revenue sharing rules.
3. For an excellent and detailed discussion of the legal arguments in this case, see Brian Porto, 
The Supreme Court and the NCAA. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012, ch. 3.
4. This result is consistent with economic theory. The monopolist produces to the left of the point 
of unitary elasticity on the demand curve. The competitive industry may produce to the right of the 
point of unitary elasticity, especially if marginal costs rise slowly. The only significant marginal 
cost to the colleges from broadcasting an extra game is the possibility that gate attendance will 
be hurt. These costs are presumably sufficiently low that the competitive industry may produce 
further to the right of unitary elasticity than the monopoly was to the left of this point (assuming 
the total revenue curve has a zero second derivative with respect to output, i.e., a linear marginal 
revenue curve.). If this is the case, then total revenues may be lower for the competitive industry. 
In addition to the revenues from post-1984 network contracts cited in the text, many schools and 
conferences entered into local and regional television deals. The number of televised contests, 
therefore, expanded appreciably. Rights fees from these local deals, however, were small and did 
not compensate for the network shortfall.
5. Another measure of inequality is provided by the Thiel Index which increased by 7.1% (from 
.310 to .332) between fy2005 and fy2010 among FBS programs. The Thiel Index goes from 0 
(perfect equality) to 1 (perfect inequality). See also Cheslock and Knight (2012).
6. It is also relevant to observe that there are some signs of weakness in the ratings for the 
Pac-12 and Big 10 networks, and the Big 10 strategy to annex the media markets of New York City 
and Washington, D.C. markets with the addition of Rutgers and Maryland may yield significant 
disappointment.
7. The scale is nonlinear, so that a school granting 80.48 athletic scholarships would receive a 
check from the NCAA for $31,874, while a school granting 242.44 scholarships would receive 
$717,805, i.e., that latter school grants three times as many scholarships but receives 22.5 times 
as much aid under this NCAA fund! That is, the big-time football programs with 85 football 
scholarships are heavily favored by this regressive distributional scheme. Data for this discussion 
is from the NCAA, 2011–12 Revenue Distribution Plan.
8. Although it appears little more than tokenism, it is at least noteworthy that one of the dis-
tribution policy details the new BCS playoff structure has revealed is the intention to make ten 
percent of the television revenue distribution contingent on the schools meeting a specified APR 
threshold. The threshold itself has not yet been set. Thus, although the link between distribution 
and academic success appears to be rather exiguous, it is noteworthy that the BCS has gone a 
step beyond the NCAA in at least recognizing the significance of this nexus.
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